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Gragert: Yakuza

YAKUZA: THE WARLORDS

OF JAPANESE
ORGANIZED CRIME
LT. BRUCE A. GRAGERT*

The power of the yakuza, Japan's legendary crime syndicates, reaches into all areas of Japan's economic life and
politics. Composed of some 3,000 separate, tightly-knit
gangs, with over 80,000 members, the yakuza survive despite Japan's 1992 Anti-gang law and other government
measures. While the range of their traditional activities
has been somewhat reduced, they have compensated by
turning to more sophisticated types of crime and by expanding their operations abroad - mostly to Southeast
Asia, parts of Latin America, and the U.S. Estimates of
their annual income from criminal activities and their
25,000 legitimate "front" organizations run to as high as
70 billion dollars, with some 500 million dollars traced
to the U.S. The author examines the history, societal context, organizational structure, activities and tactics of the
yakuza and concludes with an assessment of how, and
the extent to which their power and criminal operations
can be curbed.
* Lt. Bruce A Gragert, JAGC, USNR, born Albion, Nebraska,May 9, 1970; admitted to bar, 1996, Nebraska and U.S. District Court, District of Nebraska. Education:
University of Nebraska at Omaha (B.S., magna cum laude, Criminal Justice, 1992);
Creighton University (J.D., magna cum laude, 1996); Naval Justice School (with honors, 1996). Recipient of the Nebraska State Bar Foundation Silver Quill Award, 1996.
Military Service: Commissioned as an Ensign in the Judge Advocate General Corps,
United States Naval Reserve, 1996. Stationed at Naval Legal Service Branch Office
Lemoore, Naval Air Station Lemoore, California. Member: Nebraska State and American Bar Associations; State Bar of Nebraska. Practice Areas: Military Law, Criminal
Law, Administrative Law, and Family Law. Married to the former Tami Ervin. Chil-
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1. INTRODUCTION

When people think about international trade and transactions
they think about multinational corporations conducting
legitimate business in commodities such as cars, oil,
electronics, textiles, etc. However, there is a darker side to
international business transactions that involves international
organized crime groups who deal in "commodities"
such as
I
narcotics, weapons, counterfeiting, and the smuggling of
women for the sex slave trade, to name just a few.
Some of the wealthiest, most organized and sophisticated of
these international organized crime groups are 300 year-old
Japanese groups called the yakuza. The majority of these
yakuza syndicates operate in and out of Japan; however, there
are many yakuza syndicates expanding their operations all
over the world to every expatriate Japanese community. This
international expansion of the yakuza and their activities will
probably continue due to their increasing involvement in the
drug and gun trade, and, more importantly, because of their
ever increasing involvement in highly sophisticated financial
crimes which have the potential to affect the economies of
foreign nations. More importantly, the yakuza syndicates,
unlike other ethnic organized crime groups, are, to a certain
degree, readily accepted by Japanese society and heavily
connected to the highest levels of government; factors which
will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate
them from the national and international scene.
Therefore, it is important that governments and law
enforcement officials around the world understand the history,
organization, structure, "business" practices and tactics, and
the future of these yakuza syndicates, if they are to combat the
"new" wave of organized crime groups in their countries. To
understand the motivation and mechanisms of the yakuza, it is
essential to have some knowledge of their long and complex
history.

dren: Katarina Ann Gragert and Nicolas Daniel Todd Gragert. Parents: Daniel James
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE YAKUZA
The history of the yakuza is filled with tales of yakuza Robin
Hoods coming to the aid of the common people. The heroes of
these tales are society's victims who bettered their lives and
lived the life of the outlaw with dignity. These tales stand at
the heart of the yakuza's self-image, and of public perception as
well. The police and most scholars challenge the accuracy of
these Robin Hood tales, but the feeling persists among the
Japanese that organized crime in Japan bears a noble past. To
understand this romantic image of the yakuza, one must go
back nearly four centuries to an era that is the source of
countless modern legends in Japan where the sword and the
samurai reigned supreme.
A. MACHI-YAKKO AND HATAMOTO-YAKKO

The modern-day yakuza are believed to be the spiritual, more
so than historical, descendants of the outlaw ronin (masterless
samurai) of the 17th century.1 When the Tokugawa Shogunate
brought peace to Japan, most samurai were left unemployed.
Knowing nothing other than combat, many of these ronin
formed into outlaw gangs called the hatamoto-yakko (servants
of the shogun).2
The hatamoto-yakko went around the
countryside terrorizing and robbing the local citizens.3
While these criminal groups might appear to be the true
fathers of the yakuza, today's yakuza identify not with the
hatamoto-yakko, but with their historic enemies, the machiyakko (servants of the town).4 The machi-yakko were bands of
young townspeople and ron in who, as fear and resentment
grew, formed into groups to defend themselves from the
frequent attacks of the hatamoto-yakko. 5 Like the yakuza of
today, the machi-yakko were adept gamblers, and they

1. FLORENCE RoME, THE TA'ITOOED MEN 48 (1975).
2. DAVID E. KAPLAN & ALEC DUBRO, YAKUZA: THE EXPLOSNE ACCOUNT OF
JAPAN'S CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD 15 (1986).

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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developed a close relationship with their leaders that may have
been a precedent for the tightly-knit modern yakuza
syndicates. 6 The villagers admired the machi-yakko standing
up to the hatamoto-yakko, and they revered them as folk heroes
and Robin Hoods.
It is understandable that the modern-yakuza, who see
themselves as honorable outlaws, have chosen to look upon the
machi-yakko as their spiritual ancestors.
But a direct
historical connection is hard to make because both yakko
groups disappeared by the late 17th century after repeated
crackdowns by the shogunate.' Although the machi-yakko
probably performed some honorable acts, they were, in truth,
also involved in criminal activities and largely known as
"disorderly rogues,'.s Therefore, the machi-yakko owe their
reputation not so much to their deeds, but to legend, in this
case, to 18th century plays in which they are portrayed as
champions of the weak. 9
B. TEKIYA AND BAKUTO

The early yakuza did not appear until the middle of the 18th
century. These early yakuza were the enterprising members of
, a medieval underworld who today are widely seen as the true
ancestors of the modern yakuza: the bakuto (traditional
gamblers) and the tekiya (street peddlers).l0 Today, alongside
the pictures of godfathers that adorn the walls of yakuza
headquarters are family trees that link the modern group,
however precariously, to the old bakuto and tekiya gangs.ll
What is so unusual is that such ancestral connections are made
not by blood, but through adoption. 12 So distinctive were the
habits of these two groups that Japanese police today still

6. Id. at 15.
7. Id. at 16.
B. Id.
9. Id.
10. Hiroaki Iwai, Organized Crime in Japan, in ORGANIZED CRIME: A GLOBAL

PERSPECTNE 20B (Robert J. Kellyed., 1986).
11. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at lB.
12.Id.
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classify most yakuza as either bakuto or tekiya; although, a
third group, the gurentai (hoodlums), was added after World
War 11.13
Each group had its own membership, origin, and territory, with
its own kumicho (boss).14 Furthermore, each group had its own
distinctive group structure, behavior patterns, codes, values,
and jargon. 15 Additionally, the ranks of both groups were
largely filled with the same types of people - the poor, the
landless, delinquents, and ancestral outcasts called
burakumin, who were people who worked with dead animals,
such as leather-workers, or in "unclean" occupations, such as
undertaking. IS Finally, the bakuto and tekiya each stuck
closely to their unique area to such an extent that they could
operate within the same small territory without conflict: the
bakuto operated along the busy highways and towns; while the
tekiya worked in the street-markets and fairs. 17
1. Tekiya
By the mid-1700's, the tekiya banded together for mutual
interest and protection from the oppression of the Tokugawa
Shogunate. The tekiya gangs established control over the
portable booths in market fairs held at temples and shrines,
and they had a reputation for shoddy goods and deceptive
salesmanship. IS The tekiya were organized according to feudal
status with members falling into one of five ranks: boss,
underboss, officers, enlisted men, and apprentices. 19 The new
members began by living in the boss's house where they did
menial chores while learning the business.2o The new members
would then join the enlisted men in peddling the boss's goods
around the country, and only after the new members returned

13.ld.
14. ROBERT Y. THORTON & KATSUYA ENDO, PREVENTING CRIME 1N AMERICA AND
JAPAN 169 (1992).
15. Iwai, supra note 10, at 208.
16. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 22.
17.ld. at 18.
18. ld. at 21.
19.1d.
20.ld.
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with favorable results were they admitted as full-status
members.2l Furthermore, all tekiya members were bound by a
strict organization, an authoritarian oyabun (literally, parent
role), and the following "Three Commandments of Tekiya: (1)
Do not touch the wife of another member; (2) Do not reveal the
secrets of the organization to the police; and (3) Keep strict
loyalty to the oyabun-kobun (literally, father-role/child-role)
relationship. "22
The tekiya bosses controlled the allocation of market-stalls and
to some extent the availability of goods which were to be sold?3
Additionally, the bosses demanded payment from street
peddlers for the privilege of opening their stalls and for
"protection" from anything happening to their stalls.24 Those
peddlers who refused payment had their goods stolen, their
customers driven away, and were physically assaulted.25 This
kind of extortion continues to the present day.
While there were territorial fights between tekiya gangs, a good
deal of cooperation existed between them, for as tekiya
members traveled from fair to fair they inevitably fell under
the care of other bosses who, upon payment, would see to it
that the members were assigned a favorable place to open their
stalls. 26
Unlike the bakuto, the tekiya operations were mostly legal.
Moreover, feudal authorities increased the power of the tekiya
bosses by granting official recognition of their status between
the years 1735 and 1740.27 The shogunate granted the tekiya
bosses this nearly official samurai status in order to reduce
widespread fraud among the gangs and to prevent future turf
wars.28 With such legitimacy, and with the rapid growth of

21. ld.
22. ld. at 21.
23.ld.
24. ld. at 22.
25.ld.
26.ld.
27.ld.
28. ld. at 22.
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towns, the tekiya gangs began to spread and began organizing
market fairs of their own. Despite this official legitimacy,
however, the gangs continued their criminal activities, such as
extortion, protection rackets, and gang wars.
2. Bakuto
The first bakuto gangs were recruited by Tokugawa
government officials who were responsible for irrigation and
construction projects. 29 These construction efforts required
large payments of money to the laborers, money that the
government officials schemed to get back by hiring bakuto to
gamble with the workers.30 Later on the bakuto organized into
disciplined groups, and they began operating along the major
highways of feudal Japan. The bakuto gave the modernyakuza
its central tradition of gambling, finger-cutting, tattooing, and
the first use of the word yakuza. 31
The term yakuza is derived from the worst possible hand in the
card game hana fuda: a hand consisting of the cards 8 (ya), 9
(ku), and 3 (za).32 The losing combination of ya-ku-za came to
be used widely among the early bakuto gangs to denote
something worthless, and it was later applied to the gamblers
themselves. 33 For years the word yakuza was limited to the
bakuto gangs - some yakuza purists today insist that the only
true yakuza are the gamblers - but by the 20th century, the
word gradually came to be used by the public to apply to both
bakuto and tekiya gangs.34
The early bakuto groups developed a set of rules that included
strict adherence to secrecy, obedience to the oyabun-kobun
system, and a ranking order determining one's status and role
within the groUp.35 Total control rested with the oyabun. New

29. Id. at 23.
30.Id.
31.Id.
32. PATRICKJ. RYAN, ORGANIZED CRIME: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 57 (1995).

33.Id.
34. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 24.

35.Id.
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recruits started out as apprentices doing menial tasks for the
oyabun, and promotions were based on a member's
performances during gang fights, gambling skills, and loyalty
to the oyabun.36
Despite some bloody territorial disputes, the bakuto generally
helped one another out. One example was the bakuto's system
of "travelers", a custom by which gamblers would visit the boss
of each region on their route, stay several days, and receive a
small amount of money for expenses.37
As stated previously, certain early bakuto gangs were granted
a measure of official sanction, although less formally than the
tekiya, and they became adept at working with the authorities;
some bakuto oyabun were even deputized.3s Such agreements
with the police allowed the gangsters to consolidate and expand
their power. Similar agreements later formed the basis for
political corruption that reached to the highest levels of the
Japanese government in modern times.
C. MODERNIZATION OF THE YAKUZA

By the turn of the 20th century, Japan had evolved into a
complex and rapidly modernizing society.
The people
witnessed the evolution of their first parliament and political
parties and the growth of a powerful, autonomous military. As
the country modernized, the yakuza expanded their activities.
The gangs became entrenched in organizing day laborers for
construction jobs and in recruiting stevedores for the
increasing business on the docks. 39 However, gambling still
remained the chief source of income for the bakuto gangs, and
the tekiya also maintained their traditional operations in the
street stalls. 40 Additionally, many yakuza bosses started
legitimate businesses to act as fronts for the group's criminal

36.Id.
37. Id. at 27.
38. Id. at 26.
39. Id. at 32.
40.Id.
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activities, and they began a custom, which has survived today,
of bribing local police and government officials.41
1. Establishing Political Connections

Both bakuto and tekiya groups continued to cultivate political
connections and gradually some groups developed close ties to
important officials.42 The gangs wanted some measure of
government sanction or at least some freedom from police
crackdowns, and they saw cooperation as the key. The
government used the gangsters to stifle labor unrest. The
relationship between the gangsters and political officials was
always on the conservative side, but late in the 19th century
this relationship evolved into ultranationalistic overtones.43
This ultranationalism emerged due to the efforts of a man born
in the mid-1800's in the city of Fukuoka named Mitsuru
Toyama, and it was Toyama who would forever change the
course of both organized crime and politics in Japan, joining
the two together in a way that endures to the present day.44
Toyama started an ultranationalist secret society called the
Dark Ocean Society that wanted Japanese expansion abroad
and authoritarian rule at home.45 The Dark Ocean Society
waged a campaign of terror, blackmail, and assassination to
exert influence over military officers and government officials
in order to achieve the goal of a new social order in Japan.46
In 1892, during the first ever national elections in Japan,
Toyama greeted it with the first ever large-scale operation
between rightists and yakuza.47 Toyama's Dark Ocean Society
agents joined with 300 members of a yakuza gang to wage a
violent campaign in support of conservative politicians.48
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 32.
[d. at 33.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 34.

48. [d.
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Suprisingly, this rightist-gangster force was joined by
policemen, who had been ordered by the Minister of Home
Affairs to assist the rightist-gangster group in harassing antigovernment opponents.49 This group was also responsible for
the assassination of the Queen of Korea which led to the
Japanese invasion of Korea in 1895.50
These secret societies fmanced their operations through
criminal activities such as gambling, prostitution, protection
rackets, strike breaking, blackmail, and control of laborers,
entertainers, and street peddlers.
These secret societies
attracted the bosses of local tekiya and bakuto gangs which
began a process that to this day continues to blur the
distinction
between
organized
crime
groups
and
ultranationalists in the minds of the Japanese citizenry.51 The
reasons that the yakuza gangs were willing to join forces with
the ultranationalists were because they both: (1) resented
foreigners; (2) hated liberalism and socialism; (3) revered a
romanticized past; (4) deified the emperor; and (5) organized
along the rigid oyabun-kobun system. 52 Additionally, the
emergence of a political left-wing and labor movement at the
turn of the century, which threatened the basis of yakuza
power, made the yakuza gangs easy converts to
ultranationalism.
Thus, began an era of yakuza cooperation with the
ultranationalists.
So successful was· the ultranationalist
movement that many members were elected to national office,
and it was these people who led Japan into World War II.
During the period leading up to World War II, the numerous
yakuza and ultranationalist gangs continued to contribute men
and muscle to the patriotic cause. For example, yakuza groups
went to occupied Manchuria and China to participate in "land
development" programs and to assist in the Japanese Opium

49.Id.
50. Id. at 35.
51. Id.
52.Id.
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Monopoly Bureau, whose job it was to raise money and weaken
public resistance through drug addiction.53
Aside from their political aspirations, the yakuza groups were
busy expanding their business activities back home in Japan.
Military expansion had brought enormous amounts of money
into Japan, and the yakuza were posturing to grab a large
share of the money. For example, in the port city of Kobe,
yakuza gangs gathered up groups of otherwise unemployable
and unskilled people and sold them for cheap labor to the
longshore fIrms in need of labor.54
However, with the onset of World War II, most yakuza gangs
were weakened in power or eliminated altogether because
yakuza members were required either to join the military or go
to prison. 55
After World War II, with Japan in ruins and the yakuza gangs
in disarray, it was ultimately the American Occupational
Forces who would, directly and indirectly, contribute to the
rebirth of the yakuza. For example, while the Government
Section of the Occupational Forces was trying to eliminate the
yakuza altogether, U.S. military intelligence officials were
secretly aiding the yakuza and ultranationalists in order to
suppress a perceived threat of growing communism.56 For
example, the yakuza were used for strike-breaking and attacks
on leftist leaders. 57 Additionally, policies of food-rationing
helped perpetuate the black market which was supplied by
American soldiers and which, as a result, brought many gangs
wealth and power. 58 In essence, the black market in foodstuffs
did for the yakuza what prohibition did for the U.S. MafIa.
Finally, the complete disarming of the civilian police force

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 38.
at 39.
at 44.
at 62.
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allowed the yakuza gangs to essentially operate unhindered by
lawenforcement.59
One noted event that happened during the occupation period,
which reestablished strong ties between the yakuza and the
police and which probably contributed to some future police
and societal tolerance of the yakuza, happened in the city of
Kobe. 60 A group of sangokujin (people of three countries)
consisting of Chinese, Taiwanese, and Koreans held several
policemen hostage. The mayor of Kobe approached the
Yamaguchi-gumi yakuza group for help. The yakuza ambushed
the sangokujin and resolved the incident. The yakuza's reward
for this act was twofold: (1) the hated sangokujin were routed;
and (2) the police owed the yakuza a long-term debt of giri
(duty or obligation).61 The Kobe incident is considered by the
yakuza to be a great patriotic stand, because they were saving
Japan from foreigners and; it was, once again, the yakuza as
champions of the common people.
2. Creation of the Gurentai

During the occupation a new type of yakuza group was forming
called the gurentai (hoodlums).62 The gurentai groups operated
through the use of threat, extortion, and violence.
Additionally, these groups were far more ruthless and violent
than the bakuto and tekiya gangs. 63 Finally, the gurentai were
also not above using violence and extortion against the common
people, which violated the long unwritten code of the bakuto
and tekiya gangs not to commit acts of violence against the
citizens.

59. [d. at 44.
60. [d. at 48.

61. [d.
62. Frank F. Y. Huang & Michael S. Vaughn, A Descriptive Analysis of Japanese
Organized Crime: The Boryokudan from 1945 to 1988, 2 INT'L CRIM. JUST. REV. 19, 25
(1992).
63. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 49.
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3. Yoshio Kodama
Perhaps the most important thing the American Occupational
Forces did, which eventually gave the yakuza unprecedented
political power, was to release from prison a Class A war
criminal named Yoshio Kodama. Kodama was released from
prison due to a combination of two . factors.
First, the
Occupational Forces feared that communism would spread to
Japan, and Kodama had connections within the criminal
underworld and the government to suppress that perceived
threat. More importantly, however, was the coming to power of
the communists in China, and the Americans' need for someone
who had previously operated in China and who had an
extensive intelligence network there. That man was Yoshio
Kodama. As a result, Kodama became one of the most
powerful men in postwar Japan, and he also became the
yakuza's link to the highest levels of Japanese government.
Kodama's activities before and during World War II made him
a very wealthy individual, and he used that money after his
release from prison to finance the founding of the LiberalDemocratic Party (LDP) which controlled the Japanese
Government until the early 1990'S.64
Kodama was a ultranationalist and a kuromaku (black curtain
puller), in other words, an individual who operated behind the
scenes influencing government policy.65
Kodama helped
N obusuke Kishi, also a war criminal, to become the Prime
Minister of Japan in 1957, and he also helped Bamboku Ohno
to become Secretary General of the LDP in 1963.66 These three
people helped to return many prewar rightists and yakuza
allies to the center stage of power in Japan.
Kodama's actions also gave the yakuza some measure of official
legitimacy. For example, in 1960, with the increase of leftist
demonstrations in Japan and the impending visit of President
Eisenhower, whose trip was later canceled, Prime Minister

64. [d. at 67.
65. [d. at 78.
66. [d. at 82.
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Kishi and Kodama enlisted the aid of the yakuza and
established a 40,000 man force to quell the demonstrations and
to protect Ike's safety.67 Additionally, in the 1960's, Kodama
even tried to establish one unified yakuza group consisting of
all the most powerful yakuza syndicates called the Kanto-kai;
however, the organization disbanded fifteen months after it
was created. 68
.
In 1972, Kodama also helped to end a long feud between two of
the most powerful yakuza syndicates, the Yamaguchi-gumi and
the Inagawa-kai, by arranging an alliance between the two
groupS.69 This alliance was extremely powerful as only four
Japanese prefectures escaped the influence of the two
syndicates. 7o
Therefore, from 1960 to the mid-1970's, Yoshio Kodama, and
the groups he represented - from the right-wing thugs, to the
yakuza syndicates, and to his minions in the government had reached the summit of power. Kodama had an army of
rightists and gangsters at his disposal, millions of dollars in his
pockets, and a corrupt and complicit government. As a result,
the underworld's kuromaku and power-broker had become the
most powerful man in Japan and, as a result, the yakuza
syndicates were tapped into the highest levels of Japanese
government.
However, in 1976, this power structure came to an end.
Kodama, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, and other high
government officials were toppled from power amid revelations
of approximately $12 million in illegal payoffs from the
. Lockheed corporation, which were paid since the 1950's to
secure airplane sales contracts from the Japanese
government. 71 As a side note, the Lockheed scandal prompted

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 85.
at 94.
at 98.
at 102.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol4/iss1/9

14

Gragert: Yakuza

1997]

YAKUZA

161

the U.S. Congress to enact the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 which prohibits overseas bribes by U.S. corporations.72
Based on the Lockheed revelations Kodama was arrested and
charges filed against him in 1981, and without ever going to
jail Kodama died in 1984.73 Thus ended the era of one of the
most, if not the most, powerful man in postwar Japan.
4. After the Occupation Years
As Japan recovered from defeat and destruction, the yakuza
were forced to move from control of necessities to control of
luxuries, such as gambling, professional sports, entertainment,
prostitution, and drugs. 74 Additionally, many of the yakuza
members quit their life of crime for legitimate sources of
income; however, a large number of them stayed and formed
the core of the new yakuza syndicates who continued to gain
enormous wealth and power.

The structure and operations of the yakuza began to change
after the war as well. The yakuza were becoming more violent,
the use of firearms increased, and common people were now
being subjected to robberies and shakedowns, all of which
violated the yakuza's unwritten code.75
Additionally,
syndicates began to enlarge to thousands of members who were
overseen by dozens of sub-oyabuns, and the larger syndicates
Furthermore, the
began to absorb the smaller ones.76
syndicates no longer consisted of just one type of yakuza group,
rather they were an amalgam of tekiya, bakuto, and gurentai
groupS.77
Although the police cracked down on the yakuza syndicates
from time to time during the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's, many
high officials in the ruling party (LDP) were less concerned

72. [d. at 114.
73. Id. at 113.
74. [d. at 76.
75. [d. at 90.
76. [d.
77. [d.
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with the day-to-day operations of the yakuza and were more
interested in forming alliances with them.78 The yakuza gangs
played an essential role in helping many politicians shape their
political careers through the help of such people as Yoshio
Kodama.
Although the death of Yoshio Kodama resulted in the loss of a
powerful connection to the Japanese government for the
yakuza, questionable payments and underworld connections,
although less obvious, still stretch far and wide among Japan's
elected officials at the local and national levels. For example,
in the Sagawa Kyubin scandal, it was revealed that yakuza
syndicates were involved in the selection of Prime Minister
Noboru Takeshita in 1987.79 Furthermore, the yakuza today
are employed in Japanese politics as fund raisers, bodyguards,
and campaign workers and in return, the yakuza bosses gain
access to many of the nation's leading politicians.so Finally,
these politicians, through yakuza pressure, have delayed many
regulatory reforms in yakuza-dominated industries such as
money lending and private guard services.8 !
In the early 1970's, the yakuza, capitalizing on their dominance
in Japan, started expanding overseas, first targeting Korea,
Thailand, the Philippines, and the rest of the Pacific Rim, then
Hawaii and the west coast of the United States, before moving
in on the rest of North and South America.
Then in the mid-1980's with the economic boon in Japan, the
yakuza used cheap loans to invest heavily into legitimate areas,
such as real estate and business, at home and abroad.
Today, with the collapse of the "bubble economy" in Japan
during the early 1990's, and the adoption of the 1992 Anti-gang
law, the yakuza as a whole are changing by streamlining.
through the absorption of the smaller syndicates into the larger

78. Id. at 78.
79. Robert Delfs, Smoking Gun; New Euidence Links Takeshita with Gangsters,
155:48 FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Dec. 3, 1992, at 18.
80. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 116.
81. Id. at 120.
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syndicates, and by some members quitting crime altogether.
However, the yakuza will continue to survive through
adaptation and through their continued connections to high
government officials.

D. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, despite legal sanctions, police crackdowns, and
scandal revelations, the yakuza syndicates are still entrenched
in Japanese society, economy, and politics, and they have
adapted their methods of operations and structure in order to
thrive. More ominously for the rest of the world, they have also
expanded their operations to parts of Southeast Asia, Europe,
and North and South America. Furthermore, even with the
Anti-gang law, the yakuza are still very much alive and well in
Japan and abroad.
In addition to the importance of knowing the history of the
yakuza, understanding their organizational structure is equally
important when it comes to developing ways to combat yakuza
organized crime in Japan and abroad.
III. YAKUZA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The yakuza organizational structure is very complex. For one
thing, the yakuza enjoy some degree of public acceptance. As a
result of this acceptance, suprisingly, at least up until 1992
with the enactment of the Anti-gang law in Japan, the yakuza
openly admitted who they were as each group had its own
distinctive insignia inscribed onto lapel pins and flags.82 Gang
members openly and proudly wore their lapel pins, and they
also carried business cards which had their name, gang name,
and rank printed on them. 83 Furthermore, the gang insignia
was displayed on their gang headquarters.84 Often on display
also, inside gang headquarters, were photos of all the previous

82. Linda L. Keene, Asian Organized Crime, 58:10 FBI LAw ENFORCEMENT BULL.
13, 15 (Oct. 1989).
83. RYAN, supra note 32, at 57.
84. Keene, supra note 82, at 15.
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godfathers of the organization, bottles containing the severed
finger-tips of yakuza members, and a complex organizational
chart which traced the group's ancestry back several
generations. 85
Several of the largest syndicates even published their own
newspapers or magazines complete with legal advice,
photographs, announcements of initiation rites, jailings, prison
releases and funerals, and moral guidelines.86
Some
syndicates, such as the Yamaguchi-gumi, even offer benefits,
such as retirement pay.87
Additionally, the yakuza groups disguise themselves and their
activities through the use of front companies or by claiming to
be political or religious organizations.88 Also, to hide their
activities, the yakuza will use archaic Japanese or heavy slang
when they talk, so the police and citizens will not know what is
being said.89
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Initially, as stated previously, each yakuza gang can itself be
classified according to its historical background as a bakuto,
tekiya, or gurentai gang. 90 Additionally, while there is no one
central administrating body governing the activities of all
yakuza groups and while each yakuza gang is, theoretically,
autonomous, most yakuza gangs join together to form
syndicates with the largest and most powerful of the gangs at
the top of the power structure.91 Furthermore, the syndicates
are not comprised solely of the same type of gang, rather the
syndicates are an amalgam of bakuto, tekiya, or gurentai gangs.

85. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 142.
86. [d. at 146.
87. [d. at 137.
88. Japan; Tycoons of Crime, ECONOMIST, Feb. 29, 1992, at 36, available in LEXIS,
Nexis NEWS Library, ECON File.
89. ROME, supra note 1, at 214.
90. WILLIAM CLIFFORD, CRIME CONTROL IN JAPAN 120 (1976).
91. Iwai, supra note 10, at 215.
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Two types of organizational structures exist in the yakuza
syndicates. The first structural type is a pyramidal power
structure which is followed by the two largest syndicates in
Japan: the Yamaguchi-gumi and the Inagawa-kai.92 The
second structural type is a federation or conglomerate
structure which is followed by the Sumiyoshi-rengo syndicate.93
1. Pyramidal Structure
The pyramidal structure type, which is based on feudal power
structures, is the traditional structure of the yakuza with
enormous power vested in the godfather of the syndicate. At
the top of the pyramid is the godfather or kumicho (supreme
chief) of the syndicate.94 Under the kumicho rule a group of
usually four shatei (younger brothers). Next follows a group of
eight directors called wakashira-hosa (assistant young leaders),
one of whom will be appointed a wakashira (young leader).
The shatei, wakashira, and wakashira-hosa function as a board
of directors who meet monthly and decide on syndicate policy
and divide up the syndicate's income, accordingly.95 A senior
consultative group called the sanro-kai, which dispenses advice
on whatever matters are presented it, also exists.96 Below this
hierarchy lies a series of lesser offices: one kambuatsu-kai
(executive), and several wakashu (young men), who each
command their own legions of kobun (children) or kumi-in
(enlisted men}.97 In addition, there are large numbers of
apprentices and fringe persons who are connected to the
syndicate. Within each individual gang of the syndicate, there
exists a maze of similar relationships all based on the oyabunkobun system. 98

92. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 30.
93. [d. at 32.

94. Honourable Mob, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 1990, at 19, available in LEXIS, Nexis
. NEWS Library, ECON File.
95. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 132.
96. [d.
97. [d.
98. [d.
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Within the syndicate each individual gang is required to issue
an annual financial report and to send monthly payments to
syndicate headquarters.99 Furthermore, within each individual
gang, a similar system of tribute operates where the kobun are
required to make monthly payments to their oyabun. Finally,
payments are also made on New Years as gifts, for funerals,
and when a member is released from prison. 1OO
2. Federation Structure
The federation structure is a new type of corporate
management system which is used by the Sumiyoshi-rengo
syndicate. The distribution of power is characterized by a
federation of gang bosses, sharing equal authority and power,
who select a kumicho from among the group members. IOI
Although the federation kumicho serves as a unifying force, his
power is less absolute than that of a kumicho in a pyramid
structure syndicate, such as the Yamaguchi-gumi, and,
consequently, more autonomy lies with the individual gangs of
the federation. lo2
Like the pyramid structured syndicates, each individual gang
is required to pay monthly tribute to the syndicate; however,
the amount is less because of the equal authority of the bosses
at the top of the federation. loa Within each individual gang, a
similar system of tribute also operates where the kobun are
required to make monthly payments to their oyabun. Finally,
like the pyramid structured syndicates, the syndicates will
make payments to individual members as New Year's gifts, for
funerals, and for being released from prison.

99.

[d. at 132.

100.
101.
102.
103.

[d.
Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 30.
KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 140.
[d.
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B. RECRUITS, APPRENTICES, AND INITIATION

The yakuza syndicates usually draw one-third of their recruits
from the bosozoku (hot-rodder) youth motorcycle gangs. 104 The
yakuza also recruit vast numbers of people from two groups
that have suffered relentless discrimination in modern Japan:
(1) the ethnic Koreans living in Japan; and (2) the burakumin members of Japan's ancestral untouchable class.105 It is
estimated that roughly 70 percent of yakuza members are of
burakumin origin. lOS The reasons these three groups are
attracted to the yakuza are: (1) the offering of a surrogate
family; (2) provision of a vehicle for upward social mobility; and
(3) the sense of belonging to a group, which is all-important in
Japan. 107
The new recruits are initiated into the yakuza group through a
ceremony, which will be discussed in detail later, that involves
the exchange of sake cups with the oyabun in the presence of a
third person. lOS Furthermore, the recruit takes a seihai-gishiki,
or oath of alliance, to verify his trustworthiness. 109 Finally, the
initiate swears to obey the basic tenets of the yakuza: "(1)
never reveal the secrets of the organization; (2) never violate
the wife or children of another member; (3) no personal
involvement with narcotics; (4) do not withhold money from the
gangs; (5) do not fail in obedience to superiors; and (6) do not
appeal to the police or law."110
Next, the new recruits will normally spend the next six to
twelve months as sanshita (apprentices).11l
During the
apprentice stage, the new recruits will be on 24 hour call for six
days and nights per week, and they will perform tasks such as

104. Joachim Kersten, Street Youths, Bosozoku, and Yakuza: Subculture Formation and Societal Reactions in Japan, 39:3 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 277, 288 (July
1993).
105. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 145.
106. Thorton & Endo, supra note 14, at 172.
107. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 146.
lOB. Iwai, supra note 10, at 215.
109. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 33.
110. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 141.
111. ROME, supra note 1, at 9B.
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cooking, cleaning, answering telephones, serving guests, and
chauffeuring. 112
To ensure the loyalty of gang members and to bond them
together, the modem yakuza syndicates have also adopted
rituals, ceremonies, and values from the traditional Japanese
society and from early yakuza groups.
C. RITUALS, V ALVES, AND CUSTOMS

1. Oyabun-Kobun System
Perhaps the single most cohesive force that binds the yakuza
members together is the oyabun-kobun system (parent
role/child role), which has continued to exist since feudal times
in business and government in modem J apan. 113 In this
system, the oyabun provide' food, clothing, shelter, protection,
advice, and help for their kobun, who in return, owe labor,
unswerving loyalty, and unquestioning obedience to their
bosses. 114 For example, an innocent kobun would be expected
to go to prison for a crime committed by his oyabun.ll5
Within the early yakuza groups, this system created great
strength and cohesion and at times would even lead to
fanatical devotion to the oyabun. Today, the oyabun-kobun
relationship continues to foster loyalty, obedience, and trust
among theyakuza, despite the modernization of Japan.
Additionally, what helps the oyabun-kobun system to thrive
are the concepts ofgiri and ninjo.
2. Giri and Ninjo
The yakuza, particularly the early yakuza groups, follow, to
some degree, the values embodied in bushido, the code of the'
samurai. Like the samurai, the yakuza would prove their
112.
113.
114.
115.

KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 143.
supra note 1, at 20.
Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 33.
KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 19.
ROME,
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manliness by the stoic endurance of pain, hunger, and
imprisonment, and violent death for the yakuza was an
honorable fate. us But at the heart of the yakuza's and
Japanese society's values, which bind people together, lie the
concepts ofgiri and ninjo.

Giri means "obligation or a strong sense of duty, and is tied up
with complex Japanese values involving loyalty, gratitude, and
moral debt. "117 In a sense, giri is the social cloth that binds
much of Japan together, and its observance plays a central role
in the oyabun-kobun system.
Ninjo roughly means "human feeling" or "emotion. "U8 Among
its many interpretations is "generosity or sympathy toward the
weak and disadvantaged, and empathy toward others. "U9
By adopting giri-ninjo, the yakuza enhanced their standing in
society, showing that, like the samurai, they could combine
compassion and kindness with their martial skills.
According to Kakuji Inagawa, former head of the Inagawa-kai,
"the yakuza are trying to pursue the road of chivalry and
patriotism. That's our biggest difference with the American
Mafia, it's our sense of giri-ninjo. The yakuza try to take care
of all society if possible, even if it takes one million yen to help
a single person. "120
But, in reality, the yakuza claims that they follow giri-ninjo
may be nothing more than a smokescreen to legitimize
themselves with the people of Japan. For example, in the Kobe
earthquake of 1995, the Yamaguchi-gumi syndicate distributed
free food for the victims, but in return, the syndicate wanted
the people to give them written testimonials saying how good

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

[d. at 28.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 29.
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they were so they could get construction contracts.l21
Furthermore, police believe the yakuza harassed businesses
into giving them the food free or at a discount. l22
The yakuza are also bound together by other values.
3. Other Values
The yakuza also appear to be bound together by adherence to a
special code of conduct involving kao (face), otoko (masculinity),
and ikka (whole family).l23 Maintaining kao is important to
commanding respect and keeping one's status within the gang;
proving otoko is a crucial element of bravado of the members;
and treating other members as family provides ikka and helps
bind the members together. 124 According to some scholars, ikka
is one of the most important values because it provides a stable
base for the quasi-family structure of the yakuza where
everyone has a defined role. l25
4. Discipline

Yakuza groups deal severely with those who break the gang's
rules. Cowardice, disobedience, and revealing gang secrets are
treated not only as acts of betrayal, but also as affronts to the
reputation and honor of the gang. 126
The punishment,
depending on the nature of the offense, ranges from simply
bowing your head and making a humble apology all the way to
execution. 127
Short of death, the worst punishment is
l28
expulsion.
After expelling the member, the boss notifies
other yakuza bosses that the member is no longer welcome in
his group, and by general agreement, the outcast could not join

121. Nicholas D. Kristof, The Quake that Hurt Kobe Helps its Criminals, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 1995, at A3.
122. [d.

123. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 33.
124. [d.
125. [d.

126. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 25.
127. ROME, supra note 1, at 97.
128. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 25.
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a rival gang. 129 For serious violations not warranting death or
expulsion, the member is subjected to yubitsume, a 'custom
introduced by the early bakuto gangs, in which the top joint of
the little fmger is ceremoniously self-amputated as an act of
contrition. 130 Mer the portion of the finger is self-amputated,
the member wraps it in a silk cloth and solemnly hands it to
the oyabun. 131
Further infractions could mean another
amputation at the second joint of the same finger or at the top
joint of another finger. 132 Today, approximately 42 percent of
yakuza have had fingers cut off. l33
5. Tattooing
The other identifying characteristic of the yakuza, the tattoo,
was introduced by the early bakuto gangs during Japan's
feudal period. In feudal times, the tattoo appeared as a mark
of punishment, and criminals were generally tattooed with one
black ring around the arm for each offense. l34 As suppression
by the ruling class touched villagers who were not criminals,
tattooing became a symbol of resistance to despotism.l35
Because it was such a test of strength to endure the pain of
tattooing, it began to take on other aspects, such as manliness,
courage, health, and vitality, and the early yakuza felt
themselves to be the possessors of such attributes. 13S Over the
years the patterns grew more complex, blending an array of
famous gods, folk heroes, animals, and flowers into one fluid
design and; by the late 17th century intricate, full-body designs
became popular with the bakuto. 137 Tattooing eventually
spread to the tekiya gangs, and today, approximately 73
percent of yakuza have some form of tattoos. l38

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

[d.
ROME, supra note 1, at 97.
[d.
KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 25.
Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 34.
ROME, supra note 1, at 54.
[d.
[d.
KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 26.
Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 34.
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6. Sakazuki-shiki
One type of ritual performed by the yakuza is sakazuki-shiki or
the ritual exchange of sake CUpS.139 The sake ceremony is used
to initiate new recruits and symbolize blood connections; to
represent entry into the oyabun-kobun relationship; to
consummate the appointment of a new godfather of a
syndicate; and to bind alliances with other yakuza
syndicates. 14o The ceremony also holds religious significance,
typically being performed on a sambo (altar) before a Shinto
shrine. 141 Additionally, the amount of sake in the cups depends
upon one's status. For example, if participants are brother and
brother, as in treaties between gang bosses, equal amounts are
poured into each cup, and if the relationship is between oyabun
and kobun, the oyabun's cup is filled six-tenths and the kobun's
four-tenths. 142
An example of an entire formal sake exchange ceremony
between oyabun and kobun is described by criminologist

Hiroaki Iwai: "... all members of the ikka [are required to]
attend, with the torimochinin (the go-between; the arranger) or
azukarinin (sponsor, guarantor of the initiate) present as
intermediaries. Rice, fish, salt, and sake are placed in the
Shinto shrine alcove when the ceremony begins. The oyabun
first drinks and then turns his cup to the kobun. The kobun
who is being admitted into the organization drinks from the
same cup. The torimochinin warns of the solemn duties of the
kobun: "As long as you carry this cup, you must be loyal to the
ikka and serve your oyabun with filial piety. Even if your wife
and children starve, you must work for the oyabun and the
ikka at the risk of your life. Your duty now is to live with this
relationship for life. Consider the oyabun as your eternal
father. Do not fearwater or fire, and volunteer to undertake
every difficult task. "143

139. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 98.
140. [d. at 20.
141. [d. at 19.
142. [d.

143. Iwai, supra note 10, at 215.
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If the ceremony was to appoint a new godfather of the
syndicate, after the sake cup exchange, the new oyabun would
be presented a flag with the syndicate's insignia embroidered
on it, a roll of silk, a traditional scroll of blank white paper, and
a sword. l44
Such ceremonies continue today; however, they are usually
abbreviated in form.
7. Demukai
Another type of ceremony the yakuza used was the demukai or
prison-release ceremony.145
The ceremony consisted of
hundreds of syndicate members lining up according to gang,
sub-gang, and personal rank at the prison gate, and after the
member was released a celebration would be held in his honor.
Additionally, the released member was also given a promotion
for doing time for the syndicate. The ceremony was an
important rite of passage for the yakuza member, because it
was a symbol that the state's rehabilitation efforts had
failed. 146
Today, these elaborate and extravagant prison-release
ceremonies have been toned down or discontinued altogether
because they began to anger the public and drew too much
police attention to the yakuza.
D. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the structure of the yakuza syndicates is a
complex system consisting of feudal and traditional oaths,
values, rituals, and personal relationships, and while these
aspects are still embraced by the modern yakuza, as time goes
on, these traditions are becoming less important - taking a
backseat to the all-encompassing pursuit of money.

144. ROME, supra note 1, at 150.
145. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 152.
146. [d.
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Because Japan is where the vast majority ofyakuza syndicates
operate, it is important to understand how organized crime is
structured in Japan.

N. STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN JAPAN
At the peak of their power in 1963, the yakuza syndicates
consisted of 184,109 members in 5,216 separate gangs.147
Today, in Japan, there are approximately 88,000 to 90,000
members l48 in some 3,300 ~eparate gangs. 149 Of this number,
75 percent are members of sixteen yakuza syndicates. 15o
However, some officials estimate that there may be as many as
ten times that number of other criminal associates.151
Members of the three largest yakuza syndicates in Japan, the
Yamaguchi-gumi, the Inagawa-kai, and the Sumiyoshi-rengo,
account for 65 percent of the total number of yakuza
members. 152
The Yamaguchi-gumi is the largest and most powerful yakuza
syndicate in Japan. Current estimates put their numbers at
30,000 members 153 in some 944 gangs throughout Japan. l54
Furthermore, the Yamaguchi-gumi is made up of members
from all three of Japan's traditional gangster classes - bakuto,
tekiya, and gurentai. 155

147. Takashi Kakimi, Organized Crime in Japan: The Boryokudan Groups, 55:10
POLICE CHIEF 161 (Oct. 1988).
148. Yamaguchi-gumi Gaining Strength, Defying Antigang Law, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, JEN File.
149. Japanese Mobsters Hard Pressed to Adapt to New Law, AGENCE FRANCEPREssE, June 3,1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
150. Yamaguchi-gumi Gaining Strength, Defying Antigang Law, supra note 148.
151. Jack Anderson & Michael Binstein, Japanese Gangsters Launder Money in
U.S., OREGONIAN, Jan. 27,1993, at B9, available in WESTLAW, OREGONIAN Database.
152. Yamaguchi-gumi Gaining Strength, Defying Antigang Law, supra note 148.
153. Quake Spells Profits for Crime Groups, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 12,
1995, at AS, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1995 WL 3291964.
154. Banks Extend Loans to Yamaguchi-gumi Gang, Paper Says, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, JEN File.
155. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 147.
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The Yamaguchi-gumi's influence spreads to all regions of
Japan; however, their headquarters are located in the port city
of Kobe. A large proportion of their operations take place
behind the front company called the Association of Harbor
Stevedoring Promotions. 156
Throughout Japan, the
Yamaguchi-gumi is heavily involved in the construction and
cargo industry through outright ownership of firms to hiring
out day laborers. They are also involved in money laundering,
smuggling, pornography, counterfeiting, extortion, prostitution,
sex slave trade, gambling, loan-sharking, and the control of
thousands of street-stall operators. Additionally, they are tied
into professional sports, such as boxing and sumo wrestling.
The Yamaguchi-gumi also controls much of the entertainment
industry from talent agencies and booking firms to the movie
companies themselves. But the majority of their illegal income
is derived from the sale of narcotics, especially amphetamines.
The Yamaguchi-gumi also derives income from legitimate
sources including real estate, video games, golf courses,
trucking, waste disposal, security services, bath houses,
restaurants, bars, hospitals, English schools, amusement
parlors, and overseas investment.
However, it is quite
probable that these businesses were purchased with "dirty"
money and may be front companies which hide other illegal
operations.
In all, it is estimated that the Yamaguchi-gumi controls "7,000
shops, 5,000 restaurants, 4,500 money-laundering operations,
2,300 bath houses, 2,500 bars, 600 property companies and 400
transport firms."157

The Inagawa-kai, at last estimate in 1984, consisted of 4,347
members in 119 gangs. l58 Unlike the Yamaguchi-gumi, the

156. ld. at 92.
157. Keith Stafford, Japanese Gangs Extend Their Criminal Tentacles Worldwide,
REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Jan. 13, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis WORLD Library,
ALLWLD File.
158. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 139.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997

29

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 4 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 9

176

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 4:1

majority of Inagawa-kai members are of strictly bakuto
stock. l59
The Inagawa-kai has headquarters located in Tokyo and
Yokohama, and their sphere of influence consists of the eastern
region of Japan. The main source of income for the Inagawakai comes from gambling activities such as bookmaking,
organizing off-shore gambling tours, and running high stakes
casinos and card games. They are also heavily involved in
loan-s~arking, overseas investment, money-laundering, gunrunning, extortion, prostitution, sex slave trade, and narcotics.
According to a 1979 police estimate, the Inagawa-kai also ran
879 legitimate businesses, such as construction and
entertainment companies, bars, cabarets, golf courses, and
restaurants. lSO
The second most powerful yakuza syndicate is the Sumiyoshirengo. At last estimate in 1984, the Sumiyoshi-rengo consisted
of 6,723 members in 113 gangs, and the majority of those
members were· of bakuto stock. l6l . The Sumiyoshi-rengo is
headquartered in Tokyo, and its sphere of influence extends to
the entire eastern region of Japan. l62
Their "business"
activities are relatively consistent with those of the Inagawakai and Yamaguchi-gumi.
Since the early 1970's, these yakuza, in general, and these
three syndicates, in particular, have expanded their operations
overseas. For example, they now have operations in: (1) South
America, Brazil, in particular; (2) the Philippines; (3) Thailand;
(4) Europe; (5) Russia; (6) China; (7) Australia; (8) South
Mrica; (9) Taiwan; (10) Korea; and (11) the United States.
In the United States, for example, the yakuza are involved in
money-laundering, extortion, prostitution, gun smuggling, drug
smuggling, gambling, enticing women for the sex slave trade,
and corporate and real estate investments. Additionally, the

159.
160.
161.
162.

ld. at 148.
ld.
ld. at 139.
ld. at 140.
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yakuza are believed to be linked to smuggling operations that
supply an estimated 90 percent of the crystal
methamphetamine
that
is
available
in
Hawaii. l63
Furthermore, authorities have traced $500 million worth of
assets in the United States, and, in Hawaii, alone, more than
50 properties ranging from golf clubs to office buildings are
owned by yakuza members. l64
While the yakuza syndicates carry out the bulk of their
criminal activities by themselves, they will also form alliances
to prevent turf wars and to do business together. These
alliances may be temporary and for only one purpose, such as
drug smuggling, or they may be on a relatively permanent
basis and for all business activities. The syndicates will also
form strategic alliances with organized crime groups of
different ethnicity. For example, the yakuza have formed
alliances with the powerful Hong Kong and Taiwan Chinese
Triads for the purposes of trafficking heroin, amphetamines,
migrant workers, and women and children for the sex slave
trade. Is5 Additionally, the yakuza have established ties with
the Russian Mafia for the purposes of gun smuggling.l66
Finally, the yakuza have established links with the American
Mafia for the purposes of gun smuggling, gambling, and
coordinating and fmancing drug smuggling operations. ls7
In conclusion, the yakuza syndicates have controlled crime and
have affected the operations of legitimate businesses in Japan
since the turn of the century due to their code of silence and
corruption and infiltration of government, law enforcement,
. and the judicial system. With the yakuza expanding their
operations overseas, foreign law enforcement officials need to

163. Karl Schoenberger, Japanese Gangsters Act To Penetrate U.S. Areas; Crime:
The Syndicates Are Moving Across America, Shifting Their Emphasis from Gambling,
Prostitution to Real Estate and Corporate Investment, L.A TIMES, Jan. 4,1992, at AlB,
available in LEXIS, Nexis WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
164. ANToNIO NICASO & LEE LAMOTHE, GLOBAL MAFIA: THE NEW WORLD ORDER
OF ORGANIZED CRIME 94 (1995).
165. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 213.
166. Russian, Japanese Gangs Link Up, DAILY YOMIURI, Nov. 11, 1992, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis WORU> Library, ALLWLD File.
167. NICASO, supra note 164, at 93.
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become familiar with the yakuza's organizational structure and
operations and develop prevention methods accordingly.
V. BUSINESS OPERATIONS OF THE YAKUZA
A. INTRODUCTION

The yakuza syndicates are involved in a wide variety of
"business" operations, some legitimate and others criminal.
The estimated total income for the yakuza syndicates as a
whole is anywhere from $10 billion to $71 billion.l68 The
legitimate operations of the yakuza will be discussed first, and
the criminal operations last.

B. LEGITIMATE BUSINESS OPERATIONS
Particularly since the 1980's, the yakuza have invested in a
vast number of legitimate enterprises in Japan and abroad.
The National Police Agency in Japan reports that the yakuza
control over 25,000 legitimate businesses in Japan alone, in
addition to their countless illegal ones. l69 These investments
and businesses include golf courses and country clubs, the
stock market, real estate firms, banks, gift shops, bars,
restaurants, night clubs, theaters, construction and demolition
firms, security services, hospitals, pachinko parlors, trucking,
hotels, waste disposal, travel agencies, and many others. The
problem with these legitimate businesses is that while a major
portion of their income is legitimate, the businesses are often
merely fronts for the yakuza syndicates' criminal operations.
Furthermore, money derived from illicit sources is often
laundered through these legitimate businesses.
Today, the yakuza are reclassifying their operations as
religious and political organizations, and as legitimate

168. Velisarios Kattoulas, Japan's Mob Closes in on Global Underworld Crown,
REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Nov. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library,
CURNWS File.
169. DENNIS J. KENNEY & JAMES O. FINCKENAUER, ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA
262 (1995).
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companies; however, these organizations are also used as
fronts to disguise their criminal activities and income.
In summary, although the yakuza are technically involved in
legitimate businesses and derive some of their income from
them, they "earn" most of their income from illegitimate
sources.
C. CRIMINAL BUSINESS OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

Since the 17th century, the yakuza have been involved in
traditional types of organized crime such as protection rackets,
street stall operators, prostitution, illegal gambling, extortion,
loansharking, narcotics, and labor racketeering. Since the late
1940's, the yakuza have expanded their operations. Now, they
are also involved in: (1) controlling the construction business
and the entertainment industry; (2) counterfeiting Japanese
currency and stamps, United States dollars, watches, and even
brand-name food products; (3) the sex slave trade; (4)
smuggling immigrant workers, drugs, guns, whale meat, and
other items; (5) insurance fraud; (6) corporate extortion; (7)
strong-armed settlement of civil disputes between creditors and
defaulting debtors and between parties involved in auto
accidents; and (8) intimidation of landowners.
In essence, the yakuza are the driving force behind virtually all
crime that is committed in Japan, and their operations have an
impact on legitimate businesses and industry in Japan as well.
Today, the yakuza's dealings in counterfeiting, narcotics, the
sex slave trade, and financial crimes affect not only Japan and
expatriate Japanese around the world, but they are also
affecting the rest of the world.
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2. Sarakin

Sarakin, which literally means "salary man financiers" are, in
other words, 10ansharks.170 The sarakin industry has heavy
gangster overtones. Loansharking involves the loaning of a
certain amount of money at usurious interest rates, and, in
addition, the borrower has to pay the loan back in an extremely
short amount of time. If the individual cannot make the
payments, he or she could be beaten up; however, the power of
the sarakin is based on far more than the threat of violence.l7l
Harassment and threats are a secondary concern· to the
Japanese. Rather, they fear the sarakin's ability to cause them
to lose face - a concept which is all important in Japan. For
example, sarakin have charged into individuals' wakes and
demanded that the widow payor they would disrupt the
funeral, or they have sent express-mailing "reminders" of
money to the debtor's children in care of their schools.172 This
loss of face displayed before the public has pushed some
Japanese to quit work, abandon their families, commit suicide
and even murder.
In the mid-1980's, government officials estimated there were
42,000 sarakin firms operating in Japan.173 These loan sharks
were largely successful because, until the mid-1980's, Japan's
mainstream fmancial institutions shied away from granting
consumer credit. However, the rapid expansion of commercial
and consumer lending by Japanese banks in the 1980's has cut
deeply into the sarakin market. But the Japanese banks .
lacked sophisticated credit check systems, and, as a result, a lot
of people defaulted on their loans. The result was that instead
of writing off all the bad loans, the banks sold them to the
yakuza. 174 In return, the banks would issue loans to the

170. KAPLAN & DlJBRO, supra note 2, at 167.
171. [d. at 168.
172. [d. at 169.
173. [d. at 167.
174. Robert Delfs, Feeding on the System, 154:47 FARE. ECON. REV., Nov. 21, 1991,
at 28,29.
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yakuza several times larger than the size of the original bad
debts. 175
This practice of the banks giving the yakuza loans and getting
them into the debt collection business is believed by many
officials to be a major cause of Japan's fmancial troubles today.
For example, of the $1 trillion or so in bad debts, officials
estimate that anywhere from 10 to 70 percent of the loans are
tainted by yakuza who are not repaying their debts. 176
Furthermore, since the yakuza were the major debt collectors
for the banks, there were only a few legitimate collection
agencies who could try to recover some of the bad debts.
However, the banks and these collection agencies generally left
the yakuza alone as they are afraid of violent retaliation by
them. For example, in the past two years, a branch manager of
Sumitomo Bank and a vice president of Hanwa bank have been
shot to death.177
In summary, although loansharking is less lucrative than it
was in the economic boon of the 1980's, it still remains a source
of yakuza income today. Furthermore, loansharking income
has been supplemented by bad debt collection on behalf of
financial institutions.
3. Extortion and Intimidation
The need for the Japanese to save face creates a unique climate
in which a whole range of extortionist crimes can thrive. As
much as gift-giving and giri contribute to the practice of
bribery, these values also make the Japanese particularly
vulnerable to blackmail, intimidation, and other related crimes.
Extortion is an old and very common practice utilized by the
yakuza, because it is easy to set up and enforce, and it is the

175. [d.
176. Sheryl WuDunn, Loan Problem's Dark Heart; Many Bad Debts Believed to
Have a Mob Taint, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis
ASIAPC Library, CURNWS File.
177. Jim Landers, Ex-police Chief Blames Gangs for Part of Japan's Economic
Woes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 24, 1995, at D1, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1995 WL 9049586.
.
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means by which they can gain control over the streets and
businesses and accumulate wealth and power. For example, in
its simplest form, extortion is accomplished by having a couple
. of yakuza members approach a proprietor of a business and
advise him of a profit-sharing plan whereby they will "protect"
the premises in return for a regular cut on the profits. 178 Then
the yakuza will give the proprietor a little time to think it over,
but should he refuse, they will drop by for something called
oreimairi, which literally means "to say thanks," but which
translates into destroying the business and assaulting the
proprietor. 179
This type of extortion is particularly entrenched in certain lines
of business called mizu shobai (water business), which consists
of bars, restaurants, and nightclubs.1so In 1980, 70 percent of
12,000 businesses, in this line of work in Yokohama alone, paid
protection money in the amount of $6.5 million to the
yakuza. 181
In addition to this simple form of extortion, the yakuza have
developed several more sophisticated types of extortion which
it utilizes in Japan and abroad.
a. Sokaiya
One form of sophisticated extortion is corporate extortion by
sokaiya (general meeting mongers).182 These white-collar
gangsters known as sokaiya purchase a few shares of a
company's stock and then they extort money from corporate
executives in exchange for not asking embarrassing questions
about scandalous information about the company's
wrongdoings or about the executives themselves or otherwise
disrupting annual stockholder meetings. l83 Sometimes these

178. ROME, supra note 1, at 156.
179. [d.

180. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 169.
181. [d.
182. [d. at 170.
183. Inami Shinnosuke, Going After the Yakuza, 39:3 JAPAN Q. 353, 356 (July-Sept.
1992).
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gangsters even accept payments for preventing other sokaiya·
or legitimate shareholders from asking embarrassing questions
or disrupting annual meetings. l84 The corporate executives are
normally willing to payoff the sokaiya for fear of losing face
before their employees and the public.
The Japanese
predilection for resolving disputes through personal and
extralegal means, rather than through lawsuits, also provides
an atmosphere for a preference of making the payments.l85
Scams devised by the sokaiya are often very ingenious. For
example, the Yamaguchi-gumi has set up a "financial research
association" whose job it is to dig up as much dirt as possible on
fmancial institutions and their executives which are located in
their locality.l86 The group then uses the information to extort
the money from the institution, and the pay-off will be
extracted in the form of an irregular financing arrangement
such as having a relative of the gang set up a dummy
corporation which will be fmanced by the bank, and then the
dummy corporation will declare bankruptcy.187
Another
common method is for the sokaiya to pose as a publisher of a
small magazine who will accept money for "subscriptions" and
"advertising" in exchange for not printing scandalous stories.1SS
The content of such stories is typically leaked to the company
before the issue is distributed, and the company then buys all
the copies of the issue at a premium price, often as high as
$100 per issue.189

Sokaiya profits fell rapidly after Japan's commercial code was
revised in the early 1980's, making such payments illegal.
However, the law merely forced the highly adaptive sokaiya
into new ventures. For example, many have simply shifted

184. Id.
185. Richard McGregor, Japan Inc. 's Dirty Secret, 41:12 WORLD PREss REV. 40
(Dec. 1994).
186. Keiji Sakurada, Yakuza Storming the Corporate Ship, TOKYO Bus. TODAY,
Apr. 1994, at 46, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, TOKBUS File.
187. [d.

188. Andrew Pollack, Japanese Weary of Sokaiya Today, Executives Have Been
Killed as Extortionists are Becoming More Violent, FRESNO BEE, June 29, 1994, at C1,
available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1994 WL 8558596.
189. [d.
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gears and begun receiving payoffs from the overseas branches
of targeted corporations, or by taking their gifts in commercial
goods instead of cash.lOO Others have founded right-wing
political groups disguising their payoffs as political
contributions. 191
As a result, the sokaiya business is still alive and well. In a
1991 survey, one-third of 2000 companies reported paying
sokaiya annual amounts ranging up to 100 million yen. l92
b. Jiageya
Another type of intimidation and extortion the yakuza is
involved in is inducing landowners and tenants to vacate land
needed by real estate developers for new projects. This type of
intimidation is carried out by yakuza members called jiageya
(land raising specialists).193 One senior officer of a Japanese
bank stated, "We neededjiage professionals because Japanese
law favors the tenant. "194
The jiageya racketeers operate by pressuring landowners
through threats, vandalism, and violence to sell their property
to them at a low price so that it can then be traded on Tokyo's
speculative real estate market at a high price.195
c. Mimbo
A fmal type of yakuza extortion comes in the realm of mimbo
(civil disputes).l96 Since many disputes are resolved by
extralegal means, the yakuza provide a sort of "mediation"
service in many disputes. The most common type of extortion
involves the aftermath of car accidents, when one party will

190. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 179.
191. [d.

192. Delfs, supra note 174, at 29.
193. 'd. at 28.
194. [d.
195. Thorton & Endo, supra note 14, at 170.

196. Kersten, supra note 104, at 290.
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frequently hire a yakuza member to visit the other party.197
The yakuza member will "suggest" that the person make a
specified payment to settle the damages, and the· person
generally pays, regardless of his actual responsibility in the
accident. l98 Then the gangster takes a cut and delivers the rest
to his client. 199
Another type of mimbo which has been discussed previously is
financial institutions hiring yakuza members to collect loans
from defaulting debtors.
d. Conclusion
In sum, the above described forms of blackmail, extortion, and
intimidation are common practice among all yakuza syndicates
today, and it generates them millions of dollars annually.
Furthermore, it is a way for the yakuza to control the streets
and gain access to the power base of the Japanese economy.
4. Insurance Fraud
The yakuza are also involved in murder-for-insurance schemes.
First, the yakuza syndicate will intimidate a Japanese
national, usually a businessman, in Japan into taking out a life
insurance policy naming a yakuza member as the
beneficiary.2oo Then the yakuza member will arrange for the
victim to "win" a "competition" providing a free vacation to
Manila in the Philippines, where the yakuza member hires an
assassin for a couple of thousand dollars to kill the victim.201
5. Gambling
Gambling is a major source of revenue for the yakuza. For
example, the yakuza run illegal bookie operations which take
bets for legalized forms of racing such as horse racing, bike
197. T.R. Reid, Japan's Police To Crack Down On Nation's Version Of Mafia,
OREGONIAN, Feb. 29, 1992, at A4, available in WESTLAW, OREGONIAN Database.
198. [d.
199. [d.

200. Stafford, supra note 157.
201. [d.
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racing, and speedboat racing.202 Additionally, the yakuza run
street-level numbers rackets, high-stakes card games and
casinos, and organize off-shore gambling tourS?03
One example of how the yakuza operate is demonstrated by
floating craps games, which is a game played with dice, whose
locale is moved around from night to night to avoid police raids.
The craps players will hang out in designated restaurants and
nightclubs waiting for the message concerning the locale of the
games. The word generally arrives through a yakuza member
who gives a signal- a finger to his nose.204 The word for nose is
the same as the word for flower, hana, and hana {uda, literally
flower cards, is a favorite card game of the Japanese?05
Finally, the yakuza are heavily involved in pachinko parlors,
which are extremely popular in Japan. Because pachinko
parlors are prohibited by law from giving cash prices, the
winners get merchandise instead.206 The players Will usually
take the merchandise to a nearby location to trade the
merchandise for cash.207 The yakuza takes a portion of the
profits from the pachinko parlors themselves and from th~
places which exchange the merchandise for cash.208
Gambling has always been a traditional source of revenue for
the yakuza and will continue to be in the future.
6. Entertainment Industry

The Japanese entertainment industry is also heavily controlled
by the yakuza. For example, they own, manage, or control
movie theaters, cabarets, talent agencies, booking firms, movie
companies, and even the entertainers themselves?09
Additionally, they receive revenue from ticket-scalping and
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 77.
[d. at 148.
ROME, supra note 1, at 101.
[d.
Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 35.
[d.
[d.
ROME, supra note 1, at 107.
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Furthermore, the yakuza are tied into professional boxing and
sumo wrestling. For example, the yakuza: (1) control the
contracts of most the sumo wrestlers; (2) are the promoters of
the matches; (3) control a major share of the ticket sales both
legal and scalped; and (4) receive a portion of the
concessions. 211
7. Labor
Labor for the construction industry and longshoremen firms is
largely controlled by the yakuza. The yakuza will furnish
lodging and food and fmd unskilled laborers jobs for the day in
exchange for a percentage of their day's wages.212 Then the
yakuza generally try and get the rest of the laborers' money
through prostitution, gambling, and drugs.
Finally, the yakuza have a strong influence over labor unions,
and they will generally, through violence, break any union
strikes.
8. Japanese Tourist Industry
Due to the wealth of Japan, many Japanese have enough
money to do extensive traveling around the world, and
wherever they go, the yakuza are close behind. The yakuza
control gift shops, tour agencies, nightclubs, and hotels in
places all over the world where Japanese tourists frequently
go. For example, in California, a common practice is for the
yakuza to accost cash-laden Japanese tourists and, through
deception or intimidation, force them to participate in selected
tours.213 Additionally, the Japanese tourists are lured into

210.
211.
212.
213.

[d.
[d. at 106.
[d. at 69.
KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 257.
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yakuza-controlled shops, and once inside the shop, they are
intimidated into buying gifts at very high prices.214
These same practices are carried out all over the world, and the
Japanese victims rarely complain to the police for fear of
retaliation and losing face among their fellow tourists.
9. Construction Industry
In addition to controlling the labor in the construction
industry, the yakuza also own or control numerous construction
and demolition firms throughout Japan. Theyakuza-controlled
firms often get construction and demolition contracts through a
system of bid rigging called dango.215 The yakuza are also
known to disrupt the construction sites of rival companies
unless they pay the yakuza a "greeting fee. "216
The yakuza earn millions of dollars annually from their control
of the construction industry, and with the destruction caused
by the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the yakuza could earn billions of
dollars from the rebuilding work.
10. Smuggling
The yakuza syndicates have smuggling operations which bring
into Japan guns, drugs, sex slaves, migrant workers, and whale
meat. This section will only discuss the smuggling of migrant
workers and whale meat as the smuggling of drugs, guns, and
sex slaves will be discussed in later sections.
The yakuza are smuggling people from Thailand, the
Philippines, Brazil, and China to work in Japan. For example,
Chinese workers are smuggled into Japan by the yakuza
through connections with Chinese Triad organized crime

214. [d. at 258.
215. Honourable Mob, supra note 94.
216. Nicholas D. Kristof, Criminal Gangs Reap Millions from Kobe Reconstruction,
SEATILE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 12, 1995, at A2, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1995 WL 4314979.
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syndicates from Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan.217 The
workers are smuggled into Japan in a variety of ways: (1) in
boatloads of 100 to 150; (2) through the use of forged passports
obtained from Indonesia and Taiwan; and (3) by spiriting
Chinese travelers away from Japanese airports after they have
obtained a one-day transit pass, which is obtained by showing
immigration authorities they were en route to a third
country.218 Most of these illegal workers are placed in jobs in:
(1) restaurants and bars; (2) the construction industry; (3)
metalworking; (4) printing; and (5) hotel kitchens?19 These
people come to Japan for a better life, and they often spend
years repaying the $25,000 it takes to smuggle them into
Japan. 220 Often, these illegal immigrants also live and work in
miserable conditions, because they are always under the threat
of being reported to the authorities if they do not obey their
employers.
The yakuza are also involved in the smuggling of whale meat
into Japan. In Japan, whale meat is a delicacy that costs about
$100 a plate, and the 300 minke whales killed legally each year
do not satisfy the demand for it.221 Furthermore, a study was
conducted which revealed that meat from protected whales
that cannot be hunted legally such as the humpback whale,
was being sold in Japanese supermarkets that were being
supplied by the yakuza. 222 This whale meat smuggling appears
to be widespread, based on a raid of a whale-meat smuggling
operation in Nagasaki in May of 1994, in which the Japanese
police seized 11 tons of undocumented whale meat.223 This
amount is probably only the tip of the iceberg, however, since
most of the smuggling remains undetected.

217. Jonathan Friedland, Traffic Problem: Rising Tide of Chinese Illegal Immigrants Worries Japan, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Aug. 4,1994, at 20, available in WESTLAW, FEER Database, File 1994 WL-FEER 2003406.
218. Id.
219. [d.
220. [d.
221. Michael D. Lemonick, Animal Genocide, Mob Style, 144:20 TIME, Nov. 14,
1994, at 77, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1994 WL 2805812.
222. [d.
223. [d.
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Finally, the yakuza are believed to smuggle into Japan
contraband such as cameras, watches, gold, precious stones,
mink stoles, jewelry, textiles, and Chinese medicines.224 .
11. Money Laundering
Due to the enormous amount of income the yakuza syndicates
derive from illegitimate sources, they need to launder the
money so it can be invested in legitimate businesses. The
yakuza have money laundering operations all over the world;
however, the United States is probably the single biggest place
where yakuza money is laundered. The most common method
the yakuza use to launder money is through the use of highvolume cash businesses such as bars, nightclubs, restaurants,
gift shops, and casinos. 225
The yakuza have also used golf course country clubs and
resorts to launder money. The operation is conducted as
follows: (1) the investors lend illegally obtained money to a
private investment company; (2) the investment company uses
new cash to buy a golf club or resort; (3) the resort property
collects huge membership fees from new members, often
overselling the maximum number of memberships available;
(4) the membership fees - the "clean" money - are then
funneled back to the original investors; and (5) then the
investment company sells its properties, sometimes at a loss.226
Another sophisticated money laundering operation was
conducted in Paris from 1987 to 1992. The operation was
conducted as follows: (1) the yakuza would wire the money to
Paris using Asian banks that routed it via Luxembourg,
Switzerland, and the Channel Islands; (2) yakuza members
rented an apartment in Paris; (3) they took out ads in Asianlanguage newspapers and recruited 300 Chinese, Vietnamese,
and Japanese people; (4) every morning, each recruit was given

224. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 198.
225. [d. at 250.
226. Ronald Grover, Catherine Yang & Robert Neff, A Japanese Laundry Worth $1
Billion?, Bus. WK., May 24, 1993, at 38, available in WESTLAW, BUSWK Database,
File 1993 WL 2142022.
.
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500 franc notes, and then directed to shops where they
purchased French designer luxury goods such as handbags and
scarves; (5) every afternoon, the purchases were deposited at
the apartment and packed for shipment; and (6) finally, after
bribing a French Customs official, the goods were exported
with forged documents back to Japan where they were sold by
ayakuza shell company.227
In conclusion, the yakuza are extremely successful at money
laundering because it is difficult for foreign law enforcement
officials to trace the money back to Japan for a number of
reasons.
First, Japan generally does not consider the
movement of "dirty" money to be a crime itself.228
Furthermore, Japanese bankers usually are not too curious
about the source of the money and also are reluctant to reveal
financial information.
12. Narcotics

Trafficking of narcotics, especially methamphetamines, is the
biggest revenue earner for the yakuza. Since .few drugs are
produced in Japan, nearly every drug and almost all
stimulants are procured and imported from foreign countries
such as Peru, Germany, South Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan.
One interesting aspect of the yakuza narcotics smuggling
business is that they have a code of practice for drug couriers,
which was discovered after a 1979 heroin bust of a yakuza
member in Hawaii. The code of practice stated: "You should
obey whatever you are told to do by your group leader. You
have no choice, you cannot refuse or complain of the leader's
instructions. The above instructions are given at the request of
the financier in order to protect ourselves and to accomplish
our work. Therefore, if you want to work and get paid for it,

227. Felix Soh, Three-step Process to Money Laundering, STRAIT TIMES, Jan_ B,
1995, at 6, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, CURNWS File.
22B. Charles J. Hanley, Japanese Crime Organizations Look to America as Land of
Opportunity, OREGONIAN, Feb. 6, 1994, at A14, available in WESTLAW, OREGONIAN
Database.
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you should follow instructions. [The pay schedule is] five
thousand dollars for the trip plus $500 more or less for your
pocket money. Your group leader will determine the amount.
You must pay for your souvenirs yourself. Your leader will pay
for your hotel and three meals. He will also pay for your
drinks, up to $75."229
As far as the types of narcotics involved, the yakuza smuggle
approximately 100 pounds per year of heroin into Japan from
Thailand and Hong Kong. 230 However, more importantly, with
the help of the yakuza the Chinese Triad organized crime
syndicates are using Japan as a trans-shipment point for
heroin being shipped to the United States.231 Apparently, the
Chinese Triads chose this route to avoid U.S. Customs
procedures due to the fact that ships coming from Japan are
normally not expected to be smuggling drugs as are ships from
Thailand.232

Additionally, the yakuza are believed to be smuggling small
quantities of marijuana into Japan.233 The yakuza also
smuggle small quantities of cocaine from Peru into Japan;
however, the cocaine trade is slow in developing because
cocaine costs $60,000 to $70,000 per kilogram, which is about
three times higher than tne cost in the United States.234
However, the smuggling of methamphetamines is· the single
biggest source of income for the yakuza, not only in the drug
trade, but of all the yakuza's illicit activities. The National
Police Agency of Japan estimates that the methamphetamine
trade accounts for 43 percent of the illicit income of the yak uza ,
bringing in an estimated $3.38 billion annually.235 However,

229. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 235.
230. [d. at 215.
231. Charles Smith, Dope Dealer's Delight, 147:11 FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Mar. 15,
1990, at 12, at 13.
232. [d.
233. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 216.
234. Smith, supra note 231, at 12.
235. Teresa Watanabe, Cult May Have Produced Drug, Sold it to Gang, L.A TIMES,
May 17, 1995, at AI, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1995 WL
2047203.
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other government officials believe the trade may be worth as
much as $6.66 billion annually.236 Former FBI Director
William Sessions stated in 1991, that the yakuza controlled an
estimated 90 percent of the crystal methamphetamine trade in
Hawaii. 237 Furthermore, the approximate street value of
crystal methamphetamine in Honolulu, as of 1993, was
$200,000 per kilo. 238
Today, the main source of methamphetamines is from Taiwan,
where yakuza-trained chemists make the "meth" in yakuzafmanced laboratories.
In conclusion, if the yakuza syndicates are to be controlled to
any extent, their income from narcotics smuggling must be
sharply curbed.
13. Weapons

.
forbidden

In Japan, ordinary citizens are
to manufacture,
trade, or sell firearms. Despite this absolute gun control, the
yakuza obtain firearms from smuggling operations in
Southeast Asia, the United States, the Philippines, France,
Brazil, Italy, South Mrica, and Russia. The Japanese National
Police Agency estimates that more than 50 percent of yakuza
weapons are smuggled from Southeast Asia.239 The syndicates
are smuggling handguns, shotguns, assault rifles, ammunition
for the weapons, and even hand grenades. One yakuza
member even claimed that if someone was willing to pay for it,
he could obtain a rocket launcher or bazooka.240
To smuggle these weapons into Japan, the yakuza employ
couriers not affiliated with the syndicate such as Japanese-

236. Smith, supra note 231, at 12.
237. Antonio Kamiya, Japanese Mobsters Said Pouring Capital into U.S., JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis WORLD Library, ALLWLD
File.

238. FBI Announces Arrests of Japanese Crime Figures in Drug Ring, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Apr. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
239. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 45.
240. Yakuza Cleanup Pushes Up Prices for Illegal Guns, MAiNiCHI DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 26,1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, CURNWS File.
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Americans, U.S. military personnel, tourists, students, and
others; and, with help from overseas brokers, conceal guns
among goods traded in lawful transactions. For example, guns
have been smuggled in coffee cans,241 fruit tins,242 blue jeans,243
inside folk-craft articles, cassette players, video recorder
cameras, and even inside pineapples, which is an item
commonly carried by Japanese tourists returning from
Hawaii. 244 Larger quantities of weaponry are often smuggled
inside the gas tanks of imported cars?45 There is even a
documented case where a large shipment of handguns from
Thailand was smuggled inside seven boxes of 70 poisonous
snakes. 246
The prices of these weapons has dropped dramatically due to
the 1992 Anti-gang law, which has made life difficult,
financially, for lower echelon yakuza members. As a result, to
earn more income the yakuza have now begun to sell the
weapons to private citizens, which has led to a sharp increase
in gun-related crimes committed by non-gangsters?47 Today,
the yakuza can purchase handguns for $1000 to $2000, down
from a previous high of $7000 to $15,000,248 and then sell them
to the public for $3000 to $9000 each.249 Additionally, the price
of United States and Russian-made assault rifles is about three
million yen, and the price for ammunition is 5,000 to 8,000 yen

241. Report Warns of Rising Yakuza Activities in U.S., JAPAN ECON. NEWSWlRE,
Apr. 2, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, JEN File.
242. Guns Smuggled to Japan in Fruit Tins, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 3,
1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1995 WL 7838709.
243. Charles J. Hanley, Smuggled U.S. Guns a Big Problem in Japan, BATON
RoUGE SUNDAY ADVOC., Mar. 27, 1994, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database,
File 1994 WL 3963736.
244. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 256.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 271.
247. Charles Smith, Out of Gangland: A Glut of Illegal Guns Worries the Authori·
ties, FAR. EAST. ECON. REV., Feb. 9, 1995, at 32, available in WESTLAW, FEER Database, File 1995 WL-FEER 2271166.
248. Charles A. Radin, Increasing Gun Violence Shakes Old-Style Japan, SEATILE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 13, 1995, at A2, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1995 WL 4301468.
.
249. Michelle Magee, Gun Violence Finally Catches Up With Japan, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 20, 1994, at.A1, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, File 1994 WL
4098960.
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per round for handguns and 30,000 yen per round for
automatic rifles. 250
Today, gun-smuggling has provided a steady stream of income
for the yakuza, and it will continue to do so as long as the
ordinary Japanese citizens have an appetite for firearms.
14. Sex Industry
Sex is big business not only in Japan, but across Southeast
Asia. The yakuza syndicates dominate the sex industry in
Japan and are heavily involved in prostitution, turkish baths,
massage parlors, pornography, sex tours, and the sex slave
trade.
The sex trade flourishes in Southeast Asia because a majority
of the people are impoverished, and the only way they can
make a "better" life for themselves is to turn to prostitution
themselves or sell their daughters to the slave traders.
In the early 1970's, the yakuza became involved in arranging
sex tours for Japanese men to the Philippines, Thailand, and
South Korea. For example, the yakuza would arrange sex tours
to South Korea, where the men would visit ''Kisaeng Houses,"
which are prostitution houses. 251 The business became so big
that legitimate hotels, travel agencies, and airlines even got
into the trade, and they also glamorized the trade through
advertisements. 252 However, in reality, life for the women and
children who worked in the "Kisaeng Houses" was anything but
pleasant.
Generally, these women and children are
impoverished migrants from the South Korean countryside who
are sold on the black market by their families for as little as
$200, and then forced into a life of prostitution.253 These sex
tours still continue today, and they continue to be fmanced by
the yakuza syndicates.

250. Yakuza Cleanup Pushes Up Prices for Illegal Guns, supra note 240.
251. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 201.

252. Id.
253. Id. at 202.
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If anything could be worse than these sex tours, it is the illegal
sex slave trade, where women knowingly volunteer, or are
tricked into coming to Japan and working as prostitutes. Some
women are sold by their families to sex slave traders, and some
are even kidnapped by them. 'The yakuza have been involved
in the sex slave trade since the early 1980's.

The women caught up in the sex slave trade come from
Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Australia,
Central and South America, and the United States. Although
some women, usually those from Thailand and the Philippines
who come from poor families and who see this as a way to make
big money, willingly come to Japan knowing they will be
prostitutes, the majority of women are tricked into coming to
Japan.
For example, in the United States, the yakuza will hire a flyby-night talent agency, and this agency will obtain women by
placing ads for singers and dancers in the entertainment press,
such as Los Angeles' Drama-logue and Music Connection. 254
When the women get to Japan, instead of being dancers and
singers, they are forced to become "hostesses" in bars and/or
prostitutes until they can repay their debts to the yakuza for
bringing them to Japan. 255
Similar ruses are used on Thai and Filipino women. After
promises of legitimate jobs, the Thai and Filipino women arrive
in Japan through yakuza-obtained forged passports, and after
they arrive their passports are taken from them, and they are
forced to work as prostitutes to payoff their "debts" to the
yakuza. 256 In "recruiting" the Thai and Filipino women the
operation goes as follows: the yakuza will hire a local agent
who promises the women fame and fortune in Japan, then the
women are told to pay about $2000 for air tickets,

254. Id. at 252.
255. Id.
256. Sex Trade Flourish,ing in Japan, 21:1 WlN NEWS 42 (Winter 1995).
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accommodations, visas and passports.257 If they cannot pay,
the money is loaned to them by the yakuza-hired agent, or
taken out of their salaries.258 The agents will often pay up to
two months' salary in advance, which may be between $2000 to
$3000. 259 The agent in Thailand or the Philippines then passes
these costs on to the yakuza in Japan, in addition to a
commission fee of around $2000.260 After everything is all said
and done, the women often owe between $15,000 to $20,000 to
the yakuza which they must repay with interest.261 To ensure
repayment, as stated previously, the yakuza will confiscate the
women's forged passports, and being illegal immigrants, the
Japanese authorities have little sympathy for the women; and,
as a result, the yakuza have strong leverage over the women.
It is often difficult, if not impossible in some cases, for these
women to repay back their debts, because often they are paid
very little and sometimes when their debt is almost repaid,
they are resold to another yakuza member and the cycle begins
all over again. 262
. Today, there are approximately 140,000 Thai and Filipino
. women working in Japan as prostitutes due to the sex slave
trade. 263 Although no official statistics can be found, there are
probably thousands of women from other countries working in
Japan under similar conditions.
In .conclusion, the sex tours and sex slave trade continue to
thrive in Japan and whatever other sexual entertainment can
be found in Japan is either yakuza-owned and operated or
subject to yakuza protection rackets.

257. Michael Heazle, The Allure of Japan: Asian Girls Looking for Jobs End Up in
the Control of the Yakuza, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Oct. 14, 1993, at 38, available in
WESTLAW, FEER Database, File 1993 WL-FEER 2002492.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Heazle, supra note 257.
262. Sex Trade Flourishing in Japan, supra note 256.
263. Id.
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D. CONCLUSION
The various yakuza syndicates control, influence, and facilitate
virtually all of the crime that is committed in Japan. They are
also deeply involved in various crimes such as narcotics,
fmancial fraud, sex, counterfeiting, and corporate extortion,
which are affecting other countries. Wherever the yakuza
syndicates have branched out throughout the world, these
same types of crimes are being committed, and the commission
of these crimes, for the most part, goes unhindered because of
the fear by the local Japanese population of the yakuza, the
code of silence of the yakuza, and the payment of bribes and
kickbacks to police and government officials. The yakuza
probably cannot be completely eliminated from the crime
business; however, through better law enforcement tactics,
international cooperation, and new laws, life for the yakuza
syndicates can be made more difficult.
VI. FUTURE OF THE YAKUZA
The question in the minds of many law enforcement officials,
particularly those in Japan, is what will become of the yakuza
in the future? To answer this question one must look at
several factors.
One factor to consider is the enactment of the Japanese Antigang law in 1992. The law allows police to designate certain
groups as organized crime groups based on the proportion of
convicted criminals among their membership and if the group
has used its name to coercively raise funds?64 The law also
mandates a crackdown on illicit gambling activities of the
syndicates and nonviolent offenses such as extortion, loan
sharking, and intervening in civil suits.265 Additionally, the
law now allows authorities to confiscate profits from drug
trafficking, and it allows more severe punishments for persons

264. Robert Delfs, Legal Conduct, 154:47 FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Nov. 21, 1991, at
34.
265. Japan Os New Anti.Gangster Law Takes Effect, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Mar.
1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASlAPC Library, JEN File.
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involved in smuggling weapons. 266 In 1993, Japan revised the
Anti-gang law to prohibit activities such as forcing unwilling
companies to buy or sell stocks, demanding unlawful margin
trading on securities transactions, scalping of entertainment
tickets, disrupting auctions, and unreasonable demands for
discounting notes. 267 The revision also prohibits yakuza groups
from forcing members to get tattoos and from cutting off their
fingertips.268
Although the new law has had some effect on the yakuza
syndicates in the form of reducing the total number of yakuza
members, it has some flaws and unwanted side-effects. Some
problems with the law are that it does not make the yakuza
gangs illegal, nor does it deal with the problems of companies
owned or indirectly controlled by the yakuza and used as a
front for illegal activities. To circumvent the law, many
syndicates are tearing .down their signs above their
headquarters and are reorganizing themselves as religious
organizations, political organizations, and as corporations. For
example, in 1992, the yakuza syndicates held a meeting and
distributed a manual entitled How to Evade the New LaW. 269
This manual advises gangs to stop looking and behaving like
violent outfits and to pose instead as legitimate businesses,
religious organizations, or political organizations?70 Many
officials in Japan believe that the laws have also had an
unwanted side-effect, namely, driving the yakuza underground
and deeper into commercial business where they will continue
to thrive and be even harder to detect. 271 For example, in 1992
the Yamaguchi-gumi ordered its affiliated gangs to register as
boards, and local bosses were told to make themselves
chairmen or presidents of their companies, which would each

266. [d.
267. Police Draft Revision Bill to Curb Financial Crimes, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE,
Feb. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis ASIAPC Library, JEN File.
268. [d.
269. Tom Ormonde, Cracking Down on the 'Yakuza', 39:5 WORLD PRESS REV. 48
(May 1992).
270. [d.
271. [d.
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be capitalized with 10 million yen. They were also told to elect
their most talented lieutenants as directors?72
Since the Yamaguchi-gumi continues to absorb smaller
syndicates and is still the largest yakuza syndicate in Japan, it
would appear that the Yamaguchi-gumi's restructuring plan
has worked.'
A second factor to consider in determining the yakuza's future
is public opinion.
TraditiOIlally, the Japanese public has accepted the yakuza to
some degree as long as they stayed within the boundaries of
prostitution, gambling, extortion, and did not commit acts of
violence and robbery against the ordinary citizens. Today, this
social contract appears to be breaking down as the syndicates
become more violent and begin to prey increasingly on the
common citizens through both extortion and intimidation. It
appears as though the new yakuza members are more
interested in making money, than honoring feudal traditions
such as not harassing the local citizenry. Despite this change
in yakuza operational tactics, however, many Japanese still
cling to the romanticized image of the yakuza as feudal Robin
Hoods who follow the virtues of humanity and justice?73
To effectively reduce the power of the yakuza, the Japanese
police need the help of the public; and, if the public continues to
view the yakuza as honorable outlaws, the police will have a
very difficult time combating the syn~icates.
Another factor is the yakuza's traditional ties with the police
and government officials. Although Japanese police claim to be
corrupt-free, nothing could be further from the truth. For
example, in 1983 a nationwide tip-off syndicate run by police
officers was uncovered. 274 . This syndicate would tip-off yakuza
syndicates about upcoming police raids and in return the
yakuza would pay them sums of money that ranged upwards of

272. Japan; Tycoons of Crime, supra note 88.
273. Ormonde, supra note 269, at 48.
274. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 160.
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$12,000. 275 Furthermore, in 1983, a bribery scandal surfaced in
which 123 members of the police were involved.276
Additionally, there has always been an unspoken cooperation
between the police and yakuza, in that if the yakuza's
operations did not go beyond accepted boundaries, the police
would leave them alone, and in return, the yakuza would act as
an alternative police force in suppressing unorganized street
crime. 277
Additionally, the yakuza still maintain connections to the
upper-echelon of power in the government as is evidenced by
recent political scandals, as discussed previously. Although
these connections are not as apparent as they were in years
past, they still exist in the form of yakuza members acting as
campaign officials, bodyguards, and fund-raisers. 278 These
connections have become even more blurred as many
syndicates have reorganized as political organizations.
What also makes it difficult to detect collusion between the
police, government officials, and the yakuza is that the concept
of bribery in Japan is muddled, largely because the custom of
gift-giving is so widespread and thoroughly institutionalized.279
In some cases, the person receiving the gift or bribe is socially
not allowed to ask any questions.
A fourth factor is that many businesses find the yakuza's
services useful. For example, the banks, as stated previously,
have used them for debt collection. Also, real-estate developers
have used them to "persuade" reluctant landowners and
tenants to sell or vacate their premises. Finally, the yakuza
have been used by government officials and businesses for the
purpose of breaking up labor strikes.
What is clear is that the yakuza will continue to thrive as long
as the public continues to view them as Robin Hoods and

275. [d.
276. [d. at 159.
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278. [d. at 116.
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powerful politicians and businessmen continue to find them
useful.
Another factor which helps the yakuza to thrive overseas is a
lack of Japanese police cooperation with foreign law
enforcement officials.
For example, the Japanese police
operate under a "dual criminality" standard, which means that
they will disseminate information only if the alleged criminal
activity is also a crime in Japan. 280
A sixth factor is that Japan does not have an American-style
RICO law or money laundering laws, which may be necessary
before any comprehensive attempt to reduce yakuza activities
can take place. 281
A seventh factor is that many Japanese citizens and corporate
officials fail to report yakuza crimes they have been the victim
of due to the all important value of saving face in Japan.
Similar to this factor is the code of silence practiced by the
yakuza whereby a member will be severely punished if he
reveals any secrets of the syndicate.
The final factor is that beyond the changes in structure,
authority, and violence, the yakuza are opting for crimes of
greater sophistication. Now, there are the intellectual yakuza
who are white-collar criminals and their economic crimes are
extremely hard to detect.282. The yakuza have proved to be
highly adaptable to adverse situations, and the newer yakuza
members are better-educated, better-traveled, and more
sophisticated; as a result, it appears as though the new yakuza
will be able to adapt to new adversities that are thrown their
way in the future.
Therefore, in my opinion the yakuza will continue to thrive and
adapt as needed for. the following reasons: (1) the yakuza have
adapted to and survived the enactment of the Anti-gang law;
(2) the public still holds a romanticized view of the yakuza as

280. Anderson, supra note 151.
281. Huang & Vaughn, supra note 62, at 43.
282. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 275.
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honorable outlaws; (3) the yakuza still have strong ties to the
police and powerful government officials; (4) many businesses
find the yakuza's services useful; (5) a lack of Japanese police
cooperation with foreign law enforcement officials; (6) a lack of
money laundering and RICO laws; (7) the reluctance of
Japanese citizens to report crimes due to Japanese emphasis
on resolving disputes through extralegal means and the all
important concept of saving face in Japan; (8) the code of
silence practiced by the yakuza; and (9) the increasing
sophistication and ability to adapt of the yakuza themselves
and their operations.
However, this does not mean that the fight against theyakuza
is hopeless, it just means that it will be extremely difficult;
although I do believe that completely eliminat~g the yakuza
syndicates is impossible. Japan and other countries can reduce
the power of the yakuza by: (1) educating the population that
the yakuza are purely criminals and not Robin Hoods; (2)
increasing international cooperation between police forces; (3)
enacting RICO and money laundering laws; (4) using
immigration controls to prevent known yakuza members from
entering their countries; (5) cutting off the yakuza's main
source of recruits, the burakumin, which will be impossible to
do unless Japanese society changes and allows these people to
climb the social ladder another way; (6) cleaning up the
structural corruption in government and law enforcement; and
(7) cutting them off from their major source of income:
methamphetamines, which will require international
cooperation between military and law enforcement officials of
Japan, the United States, Taiwan, and others.
In conclusion, while the future of the yakuza remains
unknown, it is a fact that despite the present control efforts
directed against the yakuza, their activities in illegal,
semilegal, and official Japanese business and politics will
continue unless the steps described above are taken,
particularly steps toward elimination of structural corruption
and political and societal reform.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The yakuza syndicates have gained footholds in Japanese
communities around the world, invested enormous sums of
money throughout the world, and formed strategic alliances
with Chinese and American organized crime groups.
The yakuza are an exceptional organized crime group, and in
the 20th century they have often played a major role in the
highest levels of Japanese politics. They have carved out a
secure niche for themselves and have accumulated more open
wealth than gangsters anywhere else in the world. The
yak uza , in every phase of their .centuries-Iong history, have
gone to great lengths to court public opinion, to make
themselves acceptable, and the public has traditionally
accepted them as long as they have not committed violent acts
against the public. However, this social contract is coming
apart at the seams as the yakuza have recently been
committing such violent acts against the common people.
Whether the Japanese can successfully alter some of the
ancient relationships between the yakuza, public, police, and
government remains to be seen. Organized crime in Japan has
grown extremely powerful since World War II, and like
organized crime everywhere, once it has become entrenched, it
is almost impossible to eliminate. It can be contained in Japan
and abroad, however, through international cooperation,
adoption of new laws, better detection methods, and most
importantly with the help of concerned citizens and corruptfree law enforcement and government officials. This will be
difficult, if not impossible, also, because the yakuza have
proved to be highly adaptive to adverse changes and as long as
there are. powerful elements in business and politics who find
the yakuza useful, they will continue to exist and thrive.
What is clear is that over the past 300 years, the yakuza have
become one of the world's most powerful and successful
criminal organizations, and that whatever the government and
public does, these once honorable Japanese outlaws are bound
to be around for centuries to come.
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